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ADDENDUM TO NOTES ON THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES IN NEW YORK
MAURICE FINKELSTEIN
T HE writer, in his paper on the Rule Against Perpetuities,
given the hospitality of this Review,' suggested that in
applying the doctrine of judicial surgery one is concerned
with deciding whether or not the testator would have re-
tained the valid portion of his will had he known that the
invalid portion would be excised.'
But, as with physical surgery, so with judicial surgery,
the process of cutting may some times go too deep and the
result may be the total destruction of the testator's intent.
An excellent example of this is in the case of Matter of
Triscett 3 in which the Appellate Division affirmed a Surro-
gate's determination upholding a trust for the life of a son
and then for the lives of such children who would survive the
son. Of course, since there might be children born to the son
after the death of the testator, a trust for their lives would
be invalid since it would be measured by lives not in being.
Here the court held that the trust was valid for the life of
the son and the lives of the children in being at the death of
the testator, even though void as to after-born children. This
decision was based on an earlier Court of Appeals case,
Matter of Mount,4 in which the same proposition was upheld.
It would appear, therefore, that a series of trusts indistin-
guishable from each other, except by the fact that some are
for the lives of living people and some for the lives of people
yet unborn, will be upheld as to the valid trusts, even though
t Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
I Finkelstein, Notes on the Rule Against Perpetuities in New' York, 26
ST. JOHN's L. REV. 245 (1952).
2 Id. at 248, 249.
3 270 App. Div. 767, 59 N. Y. S. 2d 474 (2d Dep't 1946), affirming 185
Misc. 599, 54 N. Y. S. 2d 798 (Surr. Ct. 1945).
4 185 N. Y. 162, 77 N. E. 999 (1906).
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the trusts for the unborn people are invalid. No considera-
tion is given in these cases to the problem of whether or not
the testator would have made any such provision had he
realized its partial ineffectiveness.
I am indebted to my colleague, Professor George Keenan,
for calling my attention to an erroneous statement in the
prior article, concerning Matter of Wilcox.5 It was there
stated:
Thus, a gift to Frances for life, followed by invalid trusts to her
children, but if she die childless to Charles and Maria, creates a con-
tingent future interest in Charles and Maria which, viewed at the
date of testator's death, may not vest within two lives. Hence, the
gift over to Charles and Maria is bad, even though in fact Frances
never had any children.6
I think this statement should be modified so as to make
it clear that the invalidity will result only if the vesting of
the gift to Charles and Maria is postponed until the death of
Frances and her children, assuming of course that she had
children on the date of the testator's death. If she had no
children and the gift to Charles and Maria was in the alterna-
tive, then, of course, even under the rule of Matter of
Wilcox, the gift would be valid.
Some interesting cases which have been decided since
the original paper appeared need to be noted.
The problem concerning what constitutes a vested re-
mainder was recently considered by the Court of Appeals in
the case of Healy v. Empire Trust Compauy.7 There it was
held that a direction in a will to pay a trust fund at the ter-
mination of the trust to two named nieces or their survivor,
creates a vested remainder, and that the nieces need not sur-
vive the life tenants in order to take under the will. It is in-
teresting to note that this holding is hardly consistent with
the statutory definition of "vested" and "contingent remain-
der," nor with the decision in Moore v. Littel.8 It rather
G194 N. Y. 288, 87 N. E. 497 (1909).
6 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 251.
7276 App. Div. 305, 94 N. Y. S. 2d 150 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 301 N. Y. 620,
93 N. E. 2d 914 (1950).
8 41 N. Y. 66 (1869).
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harps back to the earlier common-law test as indicated in the
writer's earlier paper.9
In considering a trust created by a deed inter vivos, the
Court of Appeals has held that where the donor created a
trust to endure during the lives of the donor and the donee
and then to continue as donee might appoint, the possibility
that the trust might be revoked during the life of the donor
excluded his life from the computation of "lives in being."
Thus Morgan v. Keyes ' 0 settled a thorny problem entirely in
accord with the analysis set forth in the earlier paper. Since
the trust could be cancelled during the life of the donor,
there was, at least during that period, no suspension of the
power of alienation at all. The suspension began only when
the donor died.
Another matter considered in the earlier article dealt
with adopted children. As there indicated, the rights of
adopted children are the same as those of natural children
except as limited by Section 115 of the Domestic Relations
Law. That section provides that if a remainder is limited
upon the death of a child, adopted children are not included
in the designation of children. This section was applied in
the recent case of Matter of Watson."
To the growing body of case law dealing with the date
upon which the membership in a class is determined, the
Appellate Division has added the decision in Safford v.
Kowalilc,12 where it was held that a class described by the
testator as "his heirs" must be determined as of the date of
the death of the testator. The same rule was applied in
Matter of Dillon' 3 to validate a gift which was to be held
"until the youngest of my grandchildren attains 21.", By
holding that the class is determined upon the death of the
testator and excluding after-born grandchildren from the
class, the will was made valid. A difficult case was decided
in Geoffroy v. Schmidt.14 There it was held that an agree-
9 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 251.
10 302 N. Y. 439, 99 N. E. 2d 230 (1951).
TI 199 Misc. 339, 99 N. Y. S. 2d 128 (Surr. Ct. 1950).
12278 App. Div. 604, 101 N. Y. S. 2d 876 (3d Dep't 1951).
13200 Misc. 147, 105 N. Y. S. 2d 541 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
14279 App. Div. 912, 110 N. Y. S. 2d 576 (2d Dep't 1952).
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ment not to seek partition violates the Rule Against Perpetu-
ities inasmuch as the "power to alienate was suspended for
an unreasonable time." This decision does not fall into any
category discussed in the earlier article, nor is it possible to
see how the power of alienation is suspended by an agree-
ment which is always cancellable by the parties thereto or
their privies.
It is interesting to note that it was still necessary in
1952 for the court to invalidate a provision suspending the
power of alienation for a specified number of years.15 On
the other hand, in Matter of Corlies,116 the continuation of a
trust until infancy expires was upheld as a condition im-
posed by law rather than by the will, and is an example of
the doctrine of administrative trusts, to which reference was
made in the earlier paper."
The writer expresses appreciation to the editors of the
Review for permission to amend his earlier paper by the com-
ments here made. John Chipman Gray, who remains the
greatest among us in the world of the Rule Against Per-
petuities, despaired that he would always do his sums
correctly.' 8 Naturally, the same apprehension falls to all
of us.
15 Matter of Linke, 279 App. Div. 1096, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 673 (2d Dep't 1952).
16201 Misc. 755, 106 N. Y. S. 2d 381 (Surr. Ct. 1951).
17 Finkelstein, supra note 1, at 249.
i8 See GRAY, THE RuLE AGAiNST PERPETUITIES ix (2d ed. 1906).
